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Experiments in economics and their application to policy design continue to gain 
increasing popular appeal. Australia is investing in training, capacity building and 
international partnerships to bring these skills to our policy makers. Economic 
experiments are used to test policy-related hypotheses: to examine the behavioural 
processes upon which the policy is built, identify policy bugs, confirm incentive 
mechanism performance, investigate new decision processes, and illustrate economic 
allocation systems to stakeholders. Experiments provide a new source of information 
to improve policy design.  
 
This paper explores a set of experiments conducted for the National Action Plan for 
Salinity and Water Quality Market Based Instruments Pilots Program. The 
experiments test bed water and salt markets. The pilot region is the Sunraysia in 
northern Victoria, Australia. The paper looks at, 
 
•  How economic experiments can answer policy questions important for field 
implementation, using the questions posed by stakeholders in Sunraysia. 
 
•  How economic experiments complement economic theory, using examples from 
the salinity and water allocation problem in Sunraysia. 
 
•  Provide examples of other water policy experiments. These experiments address 
water allocation questions important to Australia.  
 
The objective of the paper is to reveal both the strengths and limits of economic 
experiments for policy. The paper is based on my experiences using experiments for 
policy design in the role of a research economist for government and as a PhD 
researcher at University. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
This paper explores the use of economic experiments for field policy design. It 
forms part of a series of papers that investigate the performance of water markets and 
alternative corrective policies for negative water externalities using economic 
experiments: Specifically, salinity from irrigation. The learnings from salinity and 
water apply to other externalities such as nitrogen, phosphorous and suspended solids; 
when the relationships between water use and the externality can be measured (point-
sources) or estimated (non-point sources). The research informs the National Action 
Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, Market Based Instruments Pilots Program.1  
 
The salinity experiments are calibrated to field conditions in the Sunraysia in 
northern Victoria, Australia. There is an operating water market in the Sunraysia. 
Irrigators can buy and sell water licenses (water property rights) in this market.2  
 
The participants (also called subjects) in the economic experiments represent 
irrigators in the Sunr aysia,  and they must make decisions about water use, salt 
impact/cost and irrigation technology (abatement). Subjects can earn and lose money 
by making these production decisions.
3 Any earnings made are paid to subjects in 
cash at the end of the experiment.  
 
Irrigation externalities for the Sunraysia are estimated using hydrological 
modelling. This modelling allocates irrigators to one of five salinity impact zones 
located along the river reach.4 The salinity modelling allows regulators to attribute 
changes in river salinity concentration, measured at the end of system CAP located at 
the South Australian city of Morgan, to individual irrigators based on location and 
                                                                   
1 See http://www.napswq.gov.au/mbi/round1. Project reports can be found in MBI Pilot 10 Final 
Report, Cap and Trade for Salinity. 
2 For information on the water market see http://www.watermove.com.au. In this market ‘traders may 
submit offers by mail, fax or online. Offers must define the trading zone, volume for trade in megalitres, price per 
megalitre and the number of exchanges for which the offer is valid’. 
3 Subjects are paid a non-salient (does not depend on their choices in the experiment) A$5 turn-up fee. 
Salient earnings vary between A$10 and A$25 depending on the decisions the subject makes in the 
experiment. Each experiment lasted between one and half to two hours including time for instructions 
and two training periods to check subjects’ understanding of the processes. 
4 The impact zones are located on the Victorian side of the Murray River between the town of Nyah 
and the South Australian border. For details of the impact zones see 
http://www.srwa.org.au/index2.htm the Lower Murray Water, Ru ral Water website.   4
water use.5 The impact zones allow environmental regulators to use point-source 
policies for a diffuse source externality. Figure 1 shows the Sunraysia, the salinity 
impact zones and the (estimated) location specific change in salinity from water trade. 
Water demand  for  Sunraysia  is approximated using gross margin estimates for 
regional crops and irrigation technology published by the Victorian and NSW 
Departments of Primary Industries. Distribution of production across the region was 
gathered from aerial photos and land-use data held by local information brokers 
‘Sunrise 21’.  
 
The experiments were conducted at the University of Melbourne Experimental 
Laboratory.6 Subjects traded in computerised environments.7 The trading programs 
were designed and developed at the University of Melbourne (see Duke and 
Gangadharan 2005, and Duke, Gangadharan and Cason, 2006, for the experiment 
instructions and the trading screens seen by subjects). The experimental environment 
included a water market where buyers and sellers could make and accept offers to buy 




To manage the salinity externality, three alternative market based policies 
(MBI) were implemented with the water market.
9  
 
                                                                   
5 The Impact Zone modelling estimates the change in river salinity concentration from an additional 
1,000 mega litres traded into an impact zone from one of the four other impact zones. In the 
experiments we use these ‘trade’ generated external estimates as a proxy for ‘use’ generated estimates 
and assume all water bought and sold is used in production.    
6 For information on economic experiments at the University of Melbourne see 
http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/dept/EDN/EDNMain.htm, The Economic Design Network.  
7 The Tradable Permit experiments were implemented using hand-run double auctions for water and 
salt. We chose to not to use computers for the TEP experiments because hand-run experiments allow 
the experimenter to better observe the formation of prices in these markets. We were also learning how 
to run simultaneous double auctions with endogenous technology change. Choosing a hand-run 
environment allows the experimenter to identify, isolate and where possible correct misunderstandings 
and mistakes within a session. This is much more difficult when a computer organises the transactions 
and performs the calculations. See Duke, Gangadharan and Cason, 2006. 
8 Water property rights in well designed markets reveal competing users’ value for the shared resource. 
The market allows users to signal their willingness to pay for the resource and broadcasts the cost of 
supply to all users. Water rights can effectively reveal the cost of changing water quantities in different 
locations within a hydro-geographic region.  
9 Water property rights alone do not reveal an important piece of missing information. Changing water 
allocations (also) impacts upon water quality. Water property rights do not effectively reveal the cost of 
salinity to different groups in the economy.   5
 I.  The Sunraysia Salinity Levy: This policy is a priced based MBI.10 The levy 
currently operates in the region and adds the cost of salinity to the price of 
water. The magnitude of the levy depends on how many impact zones the 
water is traded across: the further the buyer from the seller the larger the 
levy. 11 Buyers only pay the levy if they buy from a seller in a lower impact 
zone. There is no cost or benefit on water traded from a higher to a lower 
impact zone. The levy also introduces a trade barrier between the highest 
salinity impact zone and all other zones: No new water can be traded into the 
HIZ.  
 
The Sunraysia Levy has been operating in the region since 2002. Empirical 
information on performance of the Levy, and its impact on water prices and 
salinity, is limited. The electronic water trade market, called Watermove, does 
report some price data. A lot of this information is however held by individual 
water brokers. Historical field data is therefore limited, and can be costly to 
collect. Further, when using field data it is difficult to isolate and control for 
different factors that can impact upon irrigator behaviour. Experiments can 
generate observations that can be used for empirical testing, and experiments 
can minimise noise in data allowing the policy designer to isolate the drivers 
of behaviour.    
 
 II.  An alternative price based design, which we call a salinity tax, is tested. The 
salinity tax removes the Sunraysia Levy trade barrier and replaces it with a tax 
equal to the external cost of water traded into the HIZ from each of the four 
lower impact zones. This design more closely follow s recommendations from 
economic theory: If the impact of an additional concentration unit of salt 
generated by water trade into the HIZ is not ‘catastrophic’, then it may be 
more efficient to use an economic incentive as compared to a command and 
control instrument (the trade barrier). The economic incentive – the tax – will 
allow irrigators with high value use for water to use additional water in the 
HIZ and to pay for the additional salt they contribute. The irrigator makes the 
choice to trade additional water and pay the salinity cost. The irrigator is in a 
                                                                   
10 See Weitzman, M.L. 1974, for a discussion of taxes/levies – price based market mechanisms – and 
tradable permits – quantity based market mechanisms.   6
better position to make this decision than the regulator (when the regulator 
uses a command and control directive). The tax minimises policy inefficiency 
caused by asymmetric information.  
 
 III.  A tradable salinity permit market is implemented alongside the water market. 
In a TEP system irrigators must hold salinity permits if they want to use water 
in production.
12  For each unit of water used an irrigator will have to hold 
corresponding salt permits. Irrigators located in higher salt impact zones need 
to hold more permits per unit of water than irrigators located in lower salt 
impact zones. A market for salt can inform irrigators, government and society 
about the cost of salt in rivers. This is because the s alt property right 
unbundles the salt right from the water right. The water price will reflect the 
scarcity of water quantity; the salt price will reflect the scarcity of water 
quality. This unbundling allows irrigators to focus management effort on both 
water and salt: Irrigators will choose to adopt salt abatement technology if the 
cost of change is less than the price of a salt  permit  in the salt market. This 
private investment provides an additional supply of salt abatement. 
 
The salinity permit can minimise a second  asymmetric information problem. 
The price of the salinity permit is determined  in the salt market  by three 
(main) features of the policy. First, the river CAP which limits the total supply 
of salt in the region (the total  number of salt permits available). Second, the 
salinity impact zones that are used by the regulator to set the required number 
of salt permits for water use in each zone. Third, irrigators’ individual demand 
for salt permits, which  is based on irrigators’ private production information 
and not known by regulators. These three design features interact to determine 
the cost of salt. The Tradable Permit system minimises a second asymmetric 
information problem because the permit market uses the irrigators’ private 
production information to set the price  for salt. Regulators in this system set 
framework and rules of the market  – the aggregate number of salt permits 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
11See http://www.srwa.org.au/index2.htm for the levies. 
12 Tradable permits can focus management effort on both water and salt. The water input is an essential 
factor in production. The user pays for the resource in the water market. Salt is an unavoidable output 
of the production process. The beneficiary – the user – can pay for using the resource – the river water 
– in the salt market. Both become essential factors of production and will be considered in all 
production decisions.   7
available in the region and the exchange rates set for salt permits. In a tax 
system  the regulator sets both the price for salt and the exchange rates for salt 
(the different tax rates across zones). In a tax system there is no aggregate 
limit on salt; as the quantity of water use increases in the region, the tax paid 
will increase and the quantity of salt will increase. The price of salt can vary in 
a TEP system depending on agricultural market conditions; the regulator must 
vary the price in a tax system.
13   
 
 
II.  Policy questions 
 
The objective of this research is to use economic experiments to illustrate and 
test water and salt markets for field policy application. This section looks at the policy 
questions that were raised by the pilot stakeholders at the beginning of the pilot. The 
purpose is to illustrate how these policy  questions are answered by the economic 
experiments.  
 
 The following questions come from field and policy officers from the regional 
water authorities and the state departments of Primary Industries and Environment, 
the Australian Government Department for Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries and the 
Murray Darling Basin Commission.  At these stakeholder meetings the use of policy 
experiments and the three policies were explained  - Salinity Levy, Salinity Tax and 
Tradable Permits for Salinity.  
 
Three policy questions that could be addressed using experiments were 
identified as important to the region and other jurisdictions considering the use of 
markets for water quality.   
 
I.  The Sunraysia Salinity Levy adds a cost to the traded price for water in the 
water market. The levy can reveal to irrigators the cost of salinity from 
production. And the user pays for the resource. The levy paid is invested in 
local salt interception schemes. The magnitude of the levy is equal to the 
estimated cost of intercepting the salt using large scale regional interception. 
The cost of interception is increasing, both at the local and national level as 
                                                                   
13 See Stavins 1996, for a discussion of  permits and taxes when the regulator has uncertain information 
about external environmental impacts.   8
(effective) new sites become scarce. Additional suppliers of salinity abatement 
could reduce the cost of salinity management.  
 
Question: ‘Engineering solutions (local and joint interception schemes) for 
salinity are rising in cost, how can we engage alternative solutions and 
suppliers (of abatement) in salinity policy?’ 
 
A market mechanism for salt can account for multiple suppliers of salt 
abatement. The requirement is; Information sufficient to define the property 
that will be traded in the market, and an exchange institution that allows a 
property right created by interception and one created by, for example, 
suspending irrigation, to be substitutes.  
 
This is a technical change q uestion. Technology change in an economic 
framework changes the productivity of resources used in production and shifts 
the demand and supply schedules for the goods to which the technology 
relates. Private values and costs change, and this private information is known 
by the individual only. Therefore, when technology is adopted by traders in 
experimental markets the traders take time to learn about the new market 
conditions.  Market performance measures should show this information 
transfer process happening in the experimental market, it can be seen in 
transaction prices and quantities moving from the pre-technology equilibrium 
to the new technology equilibrium. (See section  IV.I for the experimental 
observations.) 
 
II.  A tradable permit market for salt creates salt property rights. The water market 
creates water property rights. These rights can be traded separately in the two 
markets. There was concern, particularly from regional water and extension 
officers, that the two markets are too complicated for irrigators to make 
profitable decisions about the quantity of water and salt permits that they 
should hold.    
 
Question: ‘Can irrigators trade in both water and salt markets; or are the 
markets too complicated and cumbersome?’   9
 
This question relates to one of  the primary uses for experiments: Can the 
trading  institution organise the exchange of  water and salt between the 
economic agents? In other words, is the system doing what it is designed to 
do? This means, are resources being allocated to least opportunity cost 
players; and are prices, quantities and efficiencies moving towards the 
predicted theoretical equilibrium given the environment? Second, is the 
system working for understandable reasons? The policy should generate the 
observed outcomes (allocations) for reasons we understand, and these reasons 
should be supported by economic theory. These questions were first posed by 
Plott, 1994. (See section  IV.II for how our experimental markets organise the 
exchange of water and salt between subjects.) 
 
III.  The Sunraysia Salinity Levy, which has operated in the region since April 
2002, introduces a trade barrier between the Highest Salt Impact Zone and all 
other Impact Zones: No new water can be traded into the HIZ. This command 
and control instrument (the trade barrier) raised questions in the region 
surrounding equity; if the environmental impact of trading water into the HIZ 
is large but not ‘catastrophic’ then why not use a large levy (tax)? A tax can 
allow irrigators located in the HIZ who are high value users of water to buy 
water from other zones. This can support growth in the HIZ while maintaining 
environmental quality in the river.  
 
Question: ‘What is the impact in the region if the Sunraysia Salinity Levy 
trade barrier is removed and replaced with a tax equal to the external cost of 
salt  if water is traded  into the HIZ from other impact zones?’ 
 
This question prompted us to test the Salinity Tax treatment.
14 
 
Experiments are useful for comparing the performance of alternative policy 
designs. It is very expensive and almost impossible to compare alternative 
                                                                   
14 Initially we planned to run three experimental treatments; (i) a water market, (ii) a water market with 
the Sunraysia Salinity Levy and, (iii) a water market with tradable salinity permits (the salt market). 
When we visited the region and looked at the design of the Sunraysia Levy more closely we decided it 
would be interesting to also investigate the salinity tax as an experimental treatment.   10 
policy designs in controlled field conditions. Using field data generated from 
the same policy in different pilot regions or alternative policies in the same 
region but across different time periods, makes it difficult to control for 
features unimportant to the policy question but which can muddy performance 
comparisons. As explained in the introduction above; in the tax treatment the 
levy trade barrier was replaced with the externality tax between the HIZ and 
all other impact zones. The magnitude of this externality tax is set equal to the 
relative difference in cost from trading water between impact zones: The cost 
to regulators of intercepting additional concentration units of salt - called EC 
(electro conductivity) units. (See section  IV.III for how this policy design 
change impacts upon water and salt in the experimental environment.) 
 
A market design question was also important.  
 
IV.  The inter-relationship between the water licence and the salt permit: Namely, 
if an irrigator must hold both a water licence and a salt permit to irrigate her 
crop, and she needs to buy these licences in the water and salt markets. How 
can the irrigator decide how much to pay for her water licence if she does not 
know how much the salt permit is going to cost? The value of the water permit 
to her depends on the cost of the salt permits. This design question is relevant 
to many water externalities. For example, nitrogen, phosphorous and 
suspended solids.   
 
Question: ‘If water and salt are interrelated how should the water and salt 
markets interact?’  
 
This question is about the design of markets for goods that are complements 
(are used or produced together) and substitutes (can be used or consumed in 
place of one another). Water and salinity are complements in production. 
Lessons from earlier markets designed for substitute goods provide the answer 
to this question. For example, the US Federal Communication auctions for 
radio spectrum. In this allocation problem the value of a radio licence depends 
on the geographical location of the other licenses the firm is successful at 
winning in the auction.  If bidders must make bids for related goods in   11 
independent markets, then they do not have all the information they need to 
make a profitable bid on the bundle. The value of each good to them depends 
on the final bundle of goods they are successful in winning (Milgrom, 2004). 
 
To minimise this information problem, and ensure the experiment subjects had 
all necessary information to make decisions about their water units and salt 
licenses, we implemented the water and salt markets simultaneously. Buyers 
and sellers could trade water and salt permits at anytime the two markets were 
open, and all necessary information – all offers and transaction prices, in both 
markets, was displayed publicly.  (See section  IV.IV for how these two 
markets interact in our experiments.) 
 
 
III. Policy experiments and economic theory  
 
  This section looks at three ways that experiments complement the use of 
economic theory in policy design, and how using humans to make decisions under the 
rules suggested by theory can reveal knowledge and information  questions we may 
not have asked before. 
 
The strength of experiments is  control,  treatment and  replication.15 It is 
important  to  isolate the policy features of most importance and then to  induce 
incentives
16  that will reveal the performance of the policy in relation to the 
questions. 17  Designing and calibrating an experiment for policy requires the 
experimenter to make operational  each feature of the mechanism. This process 
strengthens the application of economic theory to real world situations. Asking human 
subjects to make real decisions with real monetary pay-offs under the rules suggested 
by theory can,  
 
                                                                   
15 These concepts are the same as control and treatment in physical experiments such as chemistry and 
biology. See Friedman and Sunder 1994, a good introduction to designing experiments. Chapter 2 in 
this book discusses the concepts of control and treatment. 
16 This means, the earnings that subjects can make in the experiment are determined by the incentives 
they face in the experiment, and no information or preferences not controlled for in the experiment 
impact upon the subjects’ decisions. 
17 When reading an economic experiment paper, it is useful to read the experiment instruction in 
conjunction with the design section in the text. This recommendation is made by some of the leading 
researchers in the field (again see Friedman and Sunder 1994). The instructions will reveal how the 
policy incentives are induced in the laboratory and will help the user of the (experimental) results 
understand which policy features the experiment captures and which it does not.    12 
 
(a) Identify our knowledge gaps about the characteristics of the environmental good.  
 
For example, in the case of environmental externalities such as salinity, 
nitrogen and phosphorous, the location of the emission matters. In many regions 
knowledge about the aggregate quantity of emissions is available but information 
that reveals the relative magnitude of the externality across locations in a water 
basin is not.  MBIs require information on the relative magnitude of the 
externality. Price based MBIs – taxes (levies) and subsidies – need information on 
the difference between the private cost of production, which includes the cost of 
buying irrigation water in the water market. And the social cost of production, 
which is the cost of water plus the cost of salt. Regulators can estimate the cost of 
salt using impact zoning, but regulators cannot know the private cost of 
production. This is an asymmetric information problem; irrigators are in the best 
position to know their private costs. In the Sunraysia the levies are set equal to the 
cost of local interception using engineering schemes. The impact zoning 
multiplies the cost of intercepting an EC unit (a concentration unit of salt) by a 
‘dilution’ factor. This multiplier takes account of discharge distance from the CAP 
at Morgan and soil attributes in the zone where the water is used, and the salt is 
therefore discharged. For example, in the Sunraysia, an additional 1,000 
megalitres of water traded into the HIZ increases salinity concentration at the end 
of system CAP by thirty times as compared to 1,000 megalitres in LIZ 1 (see 
Figure 1). Therefore, the emission tax on water traded into the HIZ should be 
thirty times the magnitude for LIZ 1. Quantity based MBIs, tradable permits for 
salt, require information on the aggregate sustainable limit of pollution – the CAP, 
and the relative impact at the CAP from another unit of emission at different 
locations. For example, if the relative difference in emission between the HIZ and 
LIZ 1 is thirty, then irrigators in the HIZ should hold thirty times the number of 
permits for each unit of water as compared to irrigators in LIZ 1.18  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
18 Trading a large number of permits in a market period takes time and incurs cost; this may prevent the 
market finding the efficient outcome because there are too many permits to trade. EC units can be 
bundled, so that fewer permits need to be traded in equilibrium. In the Salt permit experiments reported 
here we simplified the experimental environment.  Our objective is to understand how these markets 
operate. In Sunraysia there are 5 salinity impact zones (see Figure 1). In this pilot test bed experiment 
we use 2 impact zones and a multiple of 4 for salt concentration between the two zones. This simplified 
environment provides some understanding without introducing additional complexity. In future   13 
 
(b) Raise questions about how the incentives created by a field policy ‘map’ to 
economic theory ;  
 
For example, the experimental design for the Sunraysia Levy and salinity tax 
experiments required careful consideration of the trading institution rules.
19 The 
differential levies paid by buyers of water require, we think, a multiple market 
design. 20  Sellers are different markets from the point of view of buyers and 
sellers’ offers are displayed separately to the buyers.
21 We chose a multiple market 
design for the following reason. Transaction price for water is an amalgamation of 
private marginal cost (marginal value) plus (minus) the location specific levy 
(tax). The magnitude  of the levy (tax) differs depending on the trade pair. If we 
used a single market, some profitable trades would be prevented because of the 
institutional design. This is because sellers make their sell offers based on private 
marginal cost, but the price the buyer must pay includes marginal cost plus levyi 
(tax i) where i is one of five impact zones. In addition, buyers’ willingness to pay 
differs depending on the trade pair; therefore the price a single seller can possibly 
receive from a buyer depends on the buyer’s location relative to each seller. In 
single market environments subjects are different in marginal value (cost) but this 
value (cost) does not differ depending on trade pairs.
 22 The salinity levy (tax) is 
similar to markets with differential transport costs. Buyers will prefer to buy from 
sellers located closer to the buyer along the river. Therefore, a buyer may be 
willing to purchase water from a seller with a higher marginal cost but a lower 
levy (tax) than a seller with a lower marginal cost but higher levy (tax).   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
experiments, we plan to increase the number of subjects and impact zones to more closely model the 
field. 
19 See Duke and Gangadharan, 2005. 
20 Goodfellow and Plott, 1990, investigate the determination of input and output prices in two markets. 
Lian and Plott, 1993, also investigate multiple markets for inputs and outputs. Noussair, Plott and 
Reizman, 1995, investigate international trade using a multiple market environment. 
21 The multiple markets mean that sellers’ offers are displayed separately to buyers, and buyers can 
choose to accept each seller’s best offer to sell. In single markets, only the one best sell offer across all 
sellers, at a point in time, is displayed and can be accepted by the buyers.  
22 We initially ran some sessions with a single market design. Subjects quickly identified that they were 
missing out on trades because sellers with whom they could profitably trade with were not necessarily 
the lowest cost sellers. The overall improvement rule meant these (higher cost but lower levy) sellers’ 
offers were not the active bid in the market.   14 
(c) Provide empirical measures that can be used to describe the performance of a 
given policy or to compare the performance of competing policies. 
 
Given the parameters used in an experiment the outcomes – the allocation of 
resources  between experiment participants measured by transaction prices and 
quantities, and economics surplus – can be predicted using economic principles. 
The observed outcomes generated under controlled experimental conditions can 
then be compared to the theory predictions. How well a policy performs compared 
to the best feasible outcome can tell us if a policy works as the economic model 
predicted. By comparing two alternative policy designs under identical controlled 
conditions we can provide estimates of the differences in outcomes. 
 
For example, given the field parameters used in our experiments we expect the 
price for water in the water market to be between 1009 – 978.
23 This price range is 
similar to that reported by Watermove in the historical price data for the region.24 
And, is the price range we expect to observe for water if economic surplus is 
maximised  across experimental subjects. Economic surplus is maximised when 
market demand equals market supply and the price for water is equal to the last 
profitable trade. We use the water market with no salinity policy as a baseline 
treatment. The baseline is used as a benchmark from which we compare the 
performance of the three salinity policies – Sunraysia Levy, Salinity Tax and 
Tradable Permits for Salinity. If we consider the performance of the levy and the 
tax: We expect, given the field parameters used, the price of water to lie between 
1029 – 930 in both of these treatments.  
 
Figure 2 shows the observed transaction price for water from the experimental 
sessions for the three treatments.  
 
In Treatment 1 , the water market baseline treatment, we can observe 
transaction price adjusting from above to within the treatment prediction of 1009 – 
978. It does not take the market long, only 3 to 4 trading periods, to transfer the 
private cost and value information between subjects, and for subjects to organise 
                                                                   
23 Duke and Gangadharan, 2005, ‘Salinity in water markets’, describes these experiments in detail and 
provides results from econometric tests for these comparisons.    15 
the allocation of water efficiently between themselves using the rules of the 
market. We can say this because the efficient equilibrium price is found.  
 
Treatment 3 is the Sunraysia Salinity Levy. In this treatment we expect the 
equilibrium price range to change to 1029 – 930. The expected equilibrium widens 
as compared to the baseline treatment because the levies and the trade barrier 
make some trades that were profitable in the free trade water market unprofitable 
or disallowed when the salinity policy is added. Theory cannot tell us where we 
expect equilibrium price to lie within this range.  Exactly w here the observed 
equilibrium price lies depends on the relative bargaining power of the marginal 
buyers and sellers, and this bargaining power can be influenced by the rules of the 
market. In figure 2, we observe that transaction price for water in Treatment 3  is 
within the predicted range for the treatment and is almost equal to the observed 
transaction price in Treatment 1. When we conduct econometric tests for these 
outcomes, we find the (null) hypothesis that the transaction price for water is the 
same in Treatment 1 (water market baseline) and Treatment 3 (Sunraysia Levy) 
cannot be rejected. Further, the transaction price in Treatment 2 (the salinity tax) 
is significantly lower transaction price in Treatment 3 (in the early market trading 
periods). We believe the observed transaction price in the Salinity Levy Treatment 
is influenced by market power conferred to sellers located in the HIZ by the water 
trade barrier, and this market power is removed when the trade barrier is removed 
(see Duke and Gangadharan, 2005).  
 
IV. The policy questions and the experiments 
 
In this section we explore how the policy experiments address the questions 
posed by the project stakeholders. 
 
IV.I  Technology Change 
 
  New interception sites, engineering solutions that minimise salty water 
entering the river by pumping this excess irrigation water away from the river to 
evaporation basins, are becoming scarce and more expensive. Landholders and other 
salt users, for example salt harvesting, could provide additional salt abatement. If 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
24 www.watermove.com.au Permanent Used Water Right/Diversion License is reported to trade at $950   16 
farmers and private firms can supply salt abatement at a lower cost than government 
engineering solutions, then there is a potential gain if we can include these 
management options in policy.  
 
  To include additional sources of salt abatement in both experiments and future 
field policies we need to know what options are available, how effective these options 
are at reducing salt in the river and how these options impact upon the irrigators’ 
production systems. Some abatement options can increase productivity and reduce 
salt, for example upgrading irrigation systems. Other options can reduce productivity 
and reduce salt, for example suspending irrigation. Knowledge about water use and 
salt impact is advanced in the Sunraysia region. The salinity impact zones provide this 
information. Knowledge about private abatement options is however scarce.  
 
Recommendation: Scientific knowledge on the effectiveness of alternative abatement 
options is not available. If we want to include private abatement in policy we need 
improved information. Information on abatement options needs to be at (least) the 
same scale as the impact zones.  
 
The Tradable Salt Permit experiments: We include private abatement in the tradable 
permit experiment. We include a limited number of options – upgrading irrigation 
technology and groundwater pumping. To include these options we constructed a 
simple hydrological model linked to the impact zone modelling. This allowed us to 
estimate the decrease in salt if the option was adopted, for different crop type and 
impact zone (see Final Report for MBI Pilot no. 10 for a discussion of the abatement 
estimates).  
 
  When salt reducing technology is inc luded in the salt permit market  the 
technology will impact upon both the water and the salt market. We expect to observe 
an increase in the price of water in the water mark et given the environment we use. 
The price of water is expected to increase because salt reducing technology increases 
water efficiency in these sessions.
25 When water efficiency increases, buyers’ demand 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
- $1,500 per ML over the 2005 and 2006 seasons. 
25 It would be interesting to include technology that is salt saving but reduces water productivity as 
would also be the case in the field. For example suspending irrigation.   17 
for water will increase and sellers’ supply of water will increase. 26  Given the 
parameters used in these experiments, expected transaction price for water  increases 
from 900  – 997 with the ‘old’ technology, to 963 – 997 if the salt abatement 
technology is chosen  (see figure 3 for these model predictions). We expect the 
quantity of water traded to increase if technology is chosen; from 7 units with the 
‘old’ technology to 11- 12 units with the ‘new’ technology (see figure 4).  
 
Salt abatement is (also) salt saving and therefore reduces the number of salt 
permits required by an irrigator for each unit of water she holds. We expect the 
quantity of salt permits in the salt market to decrease from 7 to 20 – 16 permits (see 
figure 5).27 For a complete discussion of these experiments see Duke et. al. 2006.  
 
Figure 3 presents the observed transaction price in the water market for the salt 
abatement treatment. Subjects can make a decision to change technology or to stay 
with their starting technology after period four ends and before period five begins. 
This is an endogenous change choice. 28 We think our experiments are the first to 
introduce endogenous change in a simultaneous double auction trading institution.  In 
Treatment 3 session 1, as shown in Figure 3, shows the market is responding to the 
technology change. 29  Although in period 5 average prices in both sessions fall, 
perhaps because subjects are unsure about the impact of the change on market 
equilibrium, information about the new (private) costs and values is quickly reflected 
in the market. Subjects first realise they can profitably trade more units of water and 
transaction quantity increases in period 5, as seen in Figure 4. Then in periods 6 to 8 
prices begin to rise towards the new equilibrium, seen in Figure 3.  
 
Observation: Markets for water and salt, implemented simultaneously and designed 
using double auction trading rules, can engage alternative sources of salt abatement: 
The markets do transfer the technology change information and traders can find the 
new efficient outcome. 
    
                                                                   
26 This is shift upwards of the market demand curve and a shift out of the market supply curve. 
27 See Duke, Gangadharan and Cason for how transaction price for salt is determined in these markets. 
28 Experiments that include exogenous determined technology change include, Buckley, Mestelman 
and Muller, 2004; and Gangadharan, Farrell and Croson, 2005.   18 
 
 
IV.II  Organising exchanges 
 
  Experiments in economics are a good illustration and communication tool. 
Engaging policymakers in a controlled environment, and asking them to make real 
decisions when faced with the incentives created by a proposed policy, can be a 
suasive method.  There is considerable knowledge about the trading institution we 
used to implement the water and salt markets: A double auction. The double auction 
exchange was chosen as it most closely matches the way the water market is 
organised in the field.
30  
 
  But, do these markets actually operate as expected? And, do they operate for 
reasons that are understandable and supported by economic theory? Can irrigators 
efficiently trade in both water and salt markets? To gain insights we can look at the 
formation of prices and quantities in the experimental markets.   
 
  Duke.C. et. al. 2006, observe that transaction prices and quantities for water 
(in the water market) and transaction price and quantity for salt (in the salt market) do 
adjust towards the expected equilibriums.  Figures 3 and 4 show these outcomes for 
the water market. Figure 5 shows the quantity of salt permits traded in the salt market. 
In figure 5, market traders find the efficient quantity of salt trade, equal to 20 permits, 
within the first four market trading periods. In period five, after the technology choice 
has occurred, traders quickly realise they now require fewer salt permits for each unit 
of water. Transaction quantity for salt permits quickly adjusts to  the new equilibrium, 
equal to 16 salt permits. Information transfer takes a bit longer in the water market.  
First traders realise they need fewer salt permits, and then they realise this reduces the 
cost to them of irrigation water,  irrigators (then) demand more water and water price 
begins to rise to the expected new equilibrium prediction. 
 
When technology change occurs, the markets take time to re-adjust. This is 
expected as it takes time for the market to transfer new value and cost information. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
29 The transaction price in session 1, is, we think, influenced by subject misunderstand about how the 
salt market operates. We adjusted the instructions in session 2, and understanding improves. This is a 
technical learning issue about how to implement simultaneous markets. See Duke et. al. 2006.   19 
This information is, however, successfully transferred (within approx. two trading 
periods) and the new efficient equilibrium price and quantities are found in both 
markets.  
 
Observation:  Market participants can organise transactions in markets for water and 
salt. 
    
IV.III  Changing the features of policy   
 
  Experiments in economics allow policy designers to focus on a particular 
feature of a policy, and to observe how policy performance changes if the one feature 
is changed holding all else constant. This is very difficult to do with field data. Duke 
and Gangadharan, 2005, investigate the impact on market performance of removing 
the Sunraysia Salinity Trade Barrier between the High Impact Zone and all other 
zones and replacing the barrier with a tax equal to the magnitude of the salinity 
externality.  
 
  Duke and Gangadharan, 2005, find that the trade barrier can create market 
power in the High Impact Zone. This is because sellers of water in the HIZ are 
monopoly suppliers to buyers of water also located in the HIZ: HIZ sellers will 
attempt to force HIZ buyers to  pay monopoly prices. If the trade barrier is removed 
and replaced with an externality tax, then HIZ sellers lose some of their monopoly 
supply power and HIZ buyers can participate in bargaining in the market.  Water 
prices are lower when an externality tax is used instead of the trade barrier and 
environmental quality does not decline.  
 
Recommendation: If a price based MBI is used (ie. a tax or levy on water) then 
externality taxes between impact zones may be more efficient then using a trade 
barrier. 





                                                                                                                                                                                                
30 In the double auction both buyers and sellers make offers to buy and sell units of the good at any 
time the market is open. Buyers can accept the sellers’ best offer and sellers’ can accept the buyers’ 
best offer at any time the market is open.    20 
IV.IV  Trading institutions and complementary goods 
 
There is a considerable amount of economic theory published about tradable 
permit markets. How the institution maps to different field environments is, however, 
often not known. Implementing field pilots to test how the policy behaves under 
different conditions is costly. Experiments allow us to observe the performance of 
policy given specific characteristics at much lower cost than field pilots. 
 
The water and salt markets are implemented simultaneously. Initially we 
considered implementing the markets sequentially. If implemented sequentially, 
subjects would first trade in the water market. Once the water market had closed, they 
would then trade in the salt market buying and selling salt permits to account for their 
water trades. Learnings by earlier researchers show, however, that sequential markets 
for water and salt could generate inefficiencies in these markets. Water and salt must 
be used together; a water user cannot use his water right if he does not hold enough 
salt property rights. If an irrigator must buy(sell) water and then salt, she does not 
have all the information needed to make profitable offers and acceptances in the water 
market. The total cost of production includes the cost of water and the cost of salt, but 
in a sequential design the price for salt is only known after all trades in the water 
market have been completed. The simultaneous design becomes even more important 
when abatement is included in the salt market. Abatement changes the relationship 
between water use and salt generation. For example, abatement could halve the 
amount of salt generated by each megalitre of water used in irrigation. The change in 
the proportions of salt and water shift the expected equilibrium outcomes in both the 
salt and water markets.  
 
Recommendation: Water markets and salinity markets should be modelled as 
simultaneous markets because water permits and salt permits are joint inputs to 
production. Salinity abatement introduces additional complications into the market 
design, as technology change shifts market parameters. 
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V.  Ideas and suggestions for future research 
 
Abatement Information: When we designed these water experiments available 
information on the external benefit of salt abating technology was scarce. Water 
pollution externalities are difficult to estimate. The issues we may need to consider for 
all water externalities include,  
 
￿  Water externalities exhibit temporal variations such that actions taken today to 
mitigate the externality may take many years to manifest benefits. In the 
experiments discussed in this paper we use estimates that assume a 30 year impact 
window (MDBC 2003), but the irrigator pays for the cost today by buying salt 
permits. Does this temporal variation and uncertainty impact upon the definition 
and security of the salt property right?  (Temporal characteristics are also 
important for N, P and SS in water.) 
 
￿  The nature of the externality may impact upon the required scale of abatement. In 
the case of salinity, actions taken by individual irrigators may generate a small 
external benefit. It may be necessary to co-ordinate actions between 
‘neighbouring’ landholders: Agglomeration of benefits. The problem is similar to 
the co-ordination of individual properties forming landscape corridors. If 
agglomeration is necessary how does this impact upon the salt property right? If 
we use group property rights, how can we manage free riding in the group, and 
how will these group rights align with individual water property rights? 
(Agglomeration may also be important for N, P and SS in water.)   
 
Parallelism: The strength of experiments is control. Control allows the experimenter 
to isolate the drivers of behavioural change.  In some cases it may be desirable to 
give-up (some) control in policy experiments  to increase parallelism with the field. 
For example,  
 
￿  In situations where the trading institution is well understood: If the rules of 
exchange are well understood it may be possible to systematically introduce 
additional field conditions to more closely represent the complexity of the real 
world. The experimenter can then observe if behaviour persists as complexity is   22 
increased in a systematic and controlled way. Friedman and Sunder 1994 discuss 
this point. 
 
For example, in the experiments reported here, the generic term unit and licence 
was used instead of water and salt permit. This is usual in experiments to remove 
unobservable values and preferences held by subjects about the good in question. 
The term tax was used. The choice to use tax may or may not impact upon 
behaviour in these experiments. If it does, the effect is not expected to be large 
enough to change behaviour significantly. An alternative non-value based term 
could be ‘cost’. To increase parallelism in future experiments we plan to use the 
terms water and salt, and to give subjects information about the nature of the farm 
(business) they are making decisions about. Given we have information from the 
(more) tightly controlled experiments, we are now more confident about relaxing 
some ‘rules’ of experimental control in the future. 
 
￿  When subject pool is a control variable: Related to the above, sometimes the 
experimenter is specifically interested in the how different subject pools behave 
under the same rules of exchange. Student subject pools minimise unobservable 
and uncontrollable private information and preferences that may influence 
behaviour. Minimising these human ‘unobservables’ can help the experimenter 
isolate drivers. However, these ‘unobservables’ may in some cases be important, 
and we may need to understand how the exchange mechanism operates when they 
are included in traders’ private information.  
 
The next experiment planned in this series will use market players (if possible 
irrigators, or other representatives from agricultural groups, research and policy 
organisations). An important consideration when using market participants is how 
to ensure their choices are induced by the incentives in the policy experiment 
(Saliency). Student subjects respond to potential payments between 15 and 30 
dollars, but irrigators’ opportunity costs are probably much higher than this. The 
use of non-salient payments such as bottles of wine or lunch, does not link their 
behaviour in the experiments to the incentives posed by the experiments. A 
thought for consideration; The impact of this non-salience may not be that great,   23 
as seen in some preliminary experiments conducted with policy officers from the 
Victorian Department of Primary Industries for this project. 
 
￿  Experiments can be used as a training tool. In some cases experiments have been 
used prior to field implementation as part of the information and marketing 
process (see for example, Cummings et. al. 2004). In these situations earlier 
controlled experiments are usually employed to test the design features of the 
mechanism.  
 
VI. Other water policy experiments 
 
This section looks at two water policy experiments conducted by European 
and US researchers. The policy design issues these experiments address are also 
important for water policy in Australia. The first experiment conducted by researchers 
at Emory University, looks at field experiments for drought auctions. In these drought 
auctions irrigators offer to suspend irrigation on acres of their land for one growing 
season. The second conducted by researchers at the University of Nottingham, looks 
at water rights when different users have peak demand requirements at different times 
of the year.  
 
In 2000, the state of Georgia i n the USA passed The Flint River Drought 
Protection Act. The Act required the state to use an auction in declared drought years 
to buy water licences from irrigators. It is interesting to note as an aside, the use of 
legislative mandates is an important driver of policy change and has (perhaps) been 
the motivation for wider use of economic incentives for environmental management 
in the US than other countries. For example, Sulphur Dioxide Trading and the Clean 
Air Act, and the RECLAIM program in Los Angles.  
 
The experiments for the Georgia Irrigation Reduction Auction (Cummings et. 
al. 2004) used both student subjects for more controlled testing of the incentives; and 
irrigators from the region to test the incentives when unobservable private information 
influences decisions in the experiment, and to communicate and train irrigators for the 
actual auction.   
   24 
The controlled experimental treatments were designed to answer questions 
about how the choice of auction design, and an organisation rule – ‘whether irrigators 
can revise offers within an auction’, affect average price paid by the regulator to the 
irrigators, the number of acres taken out of irrigation and auction efficiency.  
 
Efficiency in these auctions is the opportunity cost of the accepted  offers 
minus the minimum opportunity cost that could have been incurred if the auction had 
secured the most productive irrigation licences to suspend from irrigation the same 
number acres (as that secured by the winning offers). In other words, the opportunity 
cost of the bundle of accepted irrigation  licences is the cost of an alternative bundle of 
licences which was not accepted. If this alternative bundle would have secured for the 
state  of Georgia  the same number of acres suspended from irrigation but at a lower 
financial cost, then this alternative bundle is the better, more efficient, bundle. If the 
state of Georgia had complete information about irrigator costs then they could have 
solved for this most efficient bundle. Because the regulator has asymmetric 
information an auction can help to reveal this private information.  
 
Cummings et. al. 2004 use the tightly controlled experiments to investigate the 
performance of a sealed auction design with offer(bid) revision and different tie 
breaking rules. The tie breaking rule was important in these drought auctions because 
the regulator has a fixed budget and it is possible that more than one bid at the highest 
accepted price could be made by irrigators in the auction. If the budget constraint 
binds then how can the regulator choose which one of the multiple but identical bids 
should be accepted? This is important for policy acceptance in the region and equity.  
 
A second technical design question was the pricing rule used in the auction. 
Cummings et. al. 2004, focus on the choice between uniform and discriminative price 
rules. In these uniform price auctions all successful bidders(irrigators) are paid the 
highest accepted offer price. This is the market clearing price. A uniform price auction 
creates incentives for bidders to truthfully offer their private value(cost) in the auction 
because only the last accepted  offer affects price received. An individual irrigator 
never knows if their offer is the market clearing offer, and if they offer ‘too high’ in a 
cost(price)  minimisation auction  then they run the risk of not having their bid 
accepted. This is called incentive compatibility.  In a discriminative price auction   25 
successful bidders are paid their own offer price. In the experimental drought auctions 
implemented by Cummings et. al., bidders in the discriminative price auction raised 
their bids as revision rounds increased. The authors conjecture that this is probably 
because the information feedback rule, which revealed the maximum offer price 
accepted, signalled to b idders i n the discriminative price auction the maximum price 
the regulator was willing to pay for suspension, and eroded any efficiency advantages 
of the discriminative price auction when bidders can make offers for multiple units 
(this was a multiple unit auction because irrigators could offer to suspend irrigation on 
one or many acres of land in their offer).
31 The pricing rule also is important for 
political acceptance. An irrigator who was paid a low price in a discriminative price 
auction will know the highest price paid (to last successful bidder) due to the revision 
rule. This low price irrigator will more than likely be disgruntled by his lower 
payment.  
 
The experimental sessions using irrigators were conducted to test the 
incentives in a less controlled environment. These sessions were implemented at the 
request of the regulator. These field sessions confirmed the performance of the 
auction design;  the field observations were similar to the controlled environment 
observations. The field sessions also allowed irrigators to raise questions about the 
auctions, which when combined with a pre-auction registration day when the policy 
was rolled out to the field, improved understanding, acceptance and success of the 
auction.  
 
The field auction was implemented in March 2001.  The auction design chosen 
was discriminative pricing, with offer revisions, no maximum accepted offer price 
announcement and random-tie breaking rules (Cummings et. al. 2004). The 
experiments are an excellent example of how economists and policymakers can work 
together.  The experiments helped the regulator to narrow down a large number of 
policy design options quickly; to identify the best design and to be able to explain 
why they chose the design against the policy objects. The field experiments helped to 
                                                                   
31 The different number of acres contained within each offer makes irrigators’ offers heterogeneous. 
Discriminative price auctions can be more incentive compatible than uniform price auctions when 
traders are heterogeneous in the goods they are offering for sale. See Milgrom, 2004, and Klemperer, 
2002 for discussion of discriminative price auctions. See Cason, Gangadharan and Duke, 2003, for 
another example of a discriminative price auction for land-use change for nitrogen reduction in rivers 
in Port Phillip Bay Victoria Australia.   26 
roll out the policy, to train field participants and to improve understanding and 
performance of the auction. 
 
In the second policy experiment summarised here, the policy question was 
how to organise the demand for water in the Syr Darya River which passes through 
the Central Asian Republics of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Abbink et. 
al. 2005). Upstream Kyrgyzstan demands water during winter for electricity 
generation: The summer flow is stored in dams and released during  the  winter 
months. Downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan demand the water for irrigation in 
summer. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the flow was regulated by 
central planners in Moscow. The river was regulated for irrigation: Kyrgyzstan was 
ordered to release summer flows, and electricity during winter was supplement by 
exports of fossil fuels from Uzbekistan and  Kazakhstan. This exchange is now 
organised through voluntary co-operative agreements negotiated between the three 
parties. Abbink et. al. 2004,  show in their model  that these agreements are 
economically beneficial for all three. In the field, however,  the agreement for the 
upstream party to release water in summer and for the downstream parties to supply 
energy during winter  has been breached repeatedly.  This allocation problem is 
important to the Central Asian Republic region, and downstream republics have plans 
to build expensive reservoirs inside their borders to improve security of water supply.  
 
Abbink et. al. 2004 implement experiments calibrated to the field conditions of 
the Syr Darya River to test these voluntary agreements. They ask the question; is non-
cooperation an outcome of the exchange institution or is it an idiosyncratic outcome 
that could change if new players are brought into the negotiation: Relevant to these 
regions because of recent domestic political change.  
 
The enforceability of agreements for temporal water demand problems is also 
relevant to other regions. For example, environmental flows in Australian rivers may 
need to be high during winter and spring to mirror the natural cycles, while 
agricultural production has peak demand for water during summer. Storage of winter 
inflow for increased water security in summer can impact upon river function in 
winter.   Another example is the investment in alternative energy  in Britain which 
driven by the UK Energy White Paper and the Government’s commitment to a large   27 
reduction in greenhouse emissions within the next decade. Alternative sources of 
energy including hydro-power are being considered. In a country that has a reputation 
for being rather damp, the UK is experiencing a drought and water restrictions for the 
first time since the mid 20th century. The distribution of rainfall across land and across 
time is changing. Water transfers are being discussed in the media. An increase in 
demand from traditional users as summer temperatures rise and a new market for 
alternative energy will create a need for improved water allocation institutions. 
Agreement enforceability is an important policy consideration.   
 
The Abbink experiments use student subjects to play the role of the Republic 
decision makers. Three subjects represent each republic and the (three) ‘republics’ 
interact repeatedly to mirror the repeated relationships in the real world.  The 
experiments investigate how much water the upstream republic releases to 
downstream users. The cooperation game problem is basically that the upstream user 
is a first mover and must decide how much water to release. The optimum outcome 
for all republics is for the upstream user to release more water than is privately 
optimal for him. The downstream republics should compensate the upstream republic, 
but this compensation is not made until a later time period. The incentive, particularly 
during low river flow years, is for the upstream player to release too little water. In 
high flow years, the private equilibrium is closer to the socially optimal equilibrium 
for all players.  
The dams proposed by the downstream players to reduce dependency on 
upstream decisions during low flow years, does improve cooperation, but the 
improvement is not significant in the experiments. The Abbink et. al. model and 
experiments show that local storage options  still  require r egional co-operation to 
maximise basin wide benefits. 
 
The Abbink experiments for temporal water allocations are a good example of 
how economic theory and controlled experiments can provide answers to why some 
exchange organisations fail. The allocation question was a high stakes question, and 
the experiments helped to reduce investments in both policy design and physical 
capital that would have had low returns.    
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VII.  Conclusion 
 
  Experiments in economics are real decision making processes. The pay-offs in 
the experiments can approximate field conditions to improve parallelism between the 
field and the experiments. The use of field participants in the experiments further 
improves parallelism. Experiments in economics do simplify the field environment. 
Simplification is necessary for control. C ontrol is essential in experimentation to 
identify and isolate the drivers of behaviour of lesser and most importance. Control 
allows experiments to  answer specific design questions that may have large impacts 
on policy outcomes. Control and treatment is difficult with field data.  
 
The interpretation of experimental results is limited to the incentives induced 
in the experiment; the experiment can answer questions that were induced and 
controlled for but not others.   While the scope of the experiment is limited by the 
design, the precision and discipline in designing experiments allows policymakers to 
understand the fundamental drivers of the policy and how these drivers interact with 
each other. Well designed policy experiments can complement other empirical 
methods and can help economists, scientists and policymakers work together more 
effectively. Economic experiments are a quick and cheap method for testing policy 
alternatives. Experiments rely on economic theory, and good economic theory can 
save significant resources. Experiments are cheaper than field pilots, and can be used 
prior to field pilots to answer difficult design questions and to educate users of the 
policy. Information and knowledge transfer in policy trials using experiments can help 
policy acceptance. Understanding of the exchange rules improves policy performance. 
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IX. Appendix  
 
Figure 1: The Sunraysia Salinity Impact Zones 
 
 Figure 2: Transaction price for water in the water market* 
*Treatment 1 is the water market with no salinity policy operating. We ran three sessions of for 
treatment 1. Treatment 2 is the water market with the salinity tax (no trade barrier). We ran four 
sessions for treatment 2. Treatment 3 is the water market with the Sunraysia Salinity Levy (including 
the trade barrier between the HIZ and all other zones). We ran four sessions for treatment 3. 
River Impact (EC) per 1,000 ML of water
traded into:
Low impact zone 1 = 0.02
Low impact zone 2 = 0.05
Low impact zone 3 = 0.1
Low impact zone 4 = 0.2
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Figure 3: Transaction price in the water market when there is a salt market 
and salt abatement technology choice. 
 
Figure 4: Transaction quantity in the water market when there is a salt market 
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